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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
G..:UlY G. MORLEY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
Case No. 
'l' I-IE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS- I 11547 
SION OP UTAH, MORLEY CON-) 
STRUCTION C 0 MP ANY, and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter arises out of an alleged industrial ac-
cident wherein the plaintiff suffered injuries and seeks 
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 
of Utah. 
1 
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The application of the appellant for compensation 
was denied by the Industrial Commission of Utah 011 
the grounds that the applicant was acting outside the 
scope of employment at the time that the injuries were 
sustained by him. From this ruling, the applicant seeks 
a review by the Supreme Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah's ruling that he was not entitled 
to workmen's compensation and the award to him of 
those benefits as provided by the laws of the State of 
Utah relating to industrial injuries. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case arises out of a series of facts, which on 
their face appear rather incredulous, but lend credence 
to the time honored phrase "truth is stranger than fic-
tion." 
The applicant was one of the general partners of 
the company known as Morley Construction Company, 
which company consisted of the applicant, his father 
and two other brothers. This company was engaged in 
the business of general construction and remodeling of 
2 
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buildings and had taken out workmen's compensation 
coverage from the State Insurance Fund ( R-16) . 
Some time prior to March 25, 1966, the applicant 
was approached by one Mrs. Thel Nelson, who stated to 
him that she had some remodeling work she wished to 
have done at her place of business, Thel's Lounge, lo-
cated at 10289 South State Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah (R-21, R-46). 
On the 25th day of March, 1966, the applicant, be-
ing in the vicinity of Thel' s Lounge at approximately 
5 :30 p.m., drove to her place of business to give her an 
estimate for the work that she desired to have done 
( R-22) . Arriving at her place of business, plaintiff 
went in and found Mrs. Nelson working behind the bar. 
She advised him that she was too busy right then to 
discuss the renovations with him, but asked him to wait 
until she got off work, which would be within a few 
minutes (R-44). Obligingly, the plaintiff sat at the bar 
and ordered a beer. Several minutes later an argument 
erupted between two patrons of the establishment who 
were, in fact, a mother and daughter, the daughter being 
one Linda Johnson (R-23, R-49). 
:Miss Johnson advised her mo'ther and Mrs. Nelson 
that it was necessary that she leave as soon as possible, 
hut her mother would not let her take the car and she 
had not way to go. Mrs. Nelson then asked l\!Ir. Morley 
if he would take Miss Johnson to her place of abode 
(R-50). Mr. Morley said he did not know the girl and 
Miss Johnson said that she did not know Mr. Morley 
3 
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(R-51), whereupon Mrs. Nelson introduced Miss John-
son to Mr. Morley (R-24), and asked Mr .. Morley to 
take her home and then return back to the place of 
business so that they could go over the planned renova-
tions and Mr. Morley could make an estimate on the 
cost of the repairs of Thel' s Lounge. 
In compliance with the request of Mrs. Nelson, 
and believing that it would be advantageous to his get-
ting the repair job, Mr. Morley left Thel's Lounge with 
.Miss Johnson at approximately 6 :00 p.m. Miss J olmson 
jumped into the driver's seat and asked to drive the 
car (R-25). Mr. Morley consented and she commenced 
driving ~outh on State Street to go to her place of resi-
dence, which was then at a motel located at the Draper 
Crossroads. The State contends by reason of the fact 
that her home address was shown in the opposite direc-
tion from where she was going that this was dispositivt: 
of where she was then residing. Such was not the case, 
and Miss J olmson testified that she was in fact living at 
a motel at the Draper Crossroads. 
Miss Johnson proceeded south on State Street (H-
26) for several blocks, when for some unknown reason 
she lost control of the car, hit a tree ,and caused grievous 
injuries to the defendant who suffered smashed ankles, 
causing him permanent disability, severe lacerations of 
his signoid colon, lacerations of the face and other parts 
(R-13), bringing about the incurring of special injurief> 
in excess of $9,000.00, to the time of the hearing of the 
matter. 
4 
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Based upon the above facts, the Industrial Com-
mis:iion held that Mr. Morley, when he left the place of 
business of Thel's Lounge, was outside the scope of his 
employment and therefore not entitled to workmen's 
compensation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPLICANT WAS WITHIN THE 
SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE 
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. 
At first blush, from the reading of the facts of the 
case, one would say that Mr. Morley was in fact on a 
frolic of his own, to wit: having some type of liason or 
affair with Linda Johnson. Nothing is further from 
the fact and truth. People, being human, are prone to 
think the worst of their fellow man and jump to what 
they think are valid assumptions. 
The disinterested testimony of Mrs. Thel Nelson, 
the proprietress of the lounge, thoroughly substantiated 
the testimony of the applicant as to just what exactly 
did happen. 
The 'V orkmen' s Compensation Act should be lib-
erally construed to effectuate its purposes and where 
there is doubt it should be resolved in favor of coverage 
of the employee. Jones v. California Packing Corp .. 
I~l U. 612, 244 P.2d 640; Johnson v. Board of Review, 
7 U.2<l 113, 320 P.2d 315. 
5 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is submited that Mr. Morley was, at the time of 
his injury, acting strictly within the scope of his em-
ployment in a manner calculated to bring benefit to his 
employer; that is, obtaining a remodeling job. This, he 
believed, was best carried out by performing a favor for 
the potential customer, the proprietress of Thel' s 
Lounge. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in several Industrial 
cases has held under circumstances which could be con-
strued to be outside the scope of employment, that the 
injured party was, in fact, within the s~ope of his em-
ployment. Such a case is Stroud v. Industrial Cornmis-
sion, 2, U.2d 270, 272 P.2d 187, wherein the Supreme 
Court rejected the contentions of the Industrial Com-
mission that an off duty police officer who was killed 
when his gun discharged while loading soda pop was, 
in fact, within the scope of his employment. 
In this case, the Supreme Court reiterates their 
holding in the Twin Peaks Canning Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 57 U. 589, 196 P. 853, wherein the Su-
preme Court said: 
"A careful reading of the decided cases will, 
however, disclose that the mere fact that the in-
jured employee, at the time of the accident was 
not in the discharge of his usual duties or was not 
directly engaged in anything connected with 
those duties, does not necessarily prevent him 
from recovering compensation in case of acci-
dental injury. ln that connection it must he re-
membered that, while a human being may do no 
6 
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more than what a machine might do, he cannot 
be classed as a machine merely. If during his 
working hours there are intervals of liesure, he 
may, during such intervals, within reasonable 
limits, move from place to place upon the prem-
ises of the employer in case he refrains from ex-
posing himself voluntarily to known or visible 
hazards or dangers. In moving about as afore-
said, he may also have social intercourse with his 
employees, and within reasonable limits may 
visit with them. In doing these things within the 
bounds of reason, the employee does not go out-
side the course of his employment." 
The Industrial Commission, in making its ruling, 
relied in the opinion of the writer to some extent upon 
the case of Rowley v. Industrial Commission, 15 U.2d 
330, 392 P.2d 1016, which is submitted is not in point 
and is distinguishable from the facts of this case. 
Even assuming for the moment that there may have 
been a slight deviation from his employment, this does 
not necessarily mean that Mr. Morley was outside the 
scope of his employment while driving Miss Johnson on 
her way home. As pointed out in the case of Carter v. 
Bessie, 97 U. 427, 93 P.2d 490: 
"A slight deviation from orders or tending in-
cidentally to other business than in the masters, 
but which does not disever the servant from the 
master's business, does not release the master 
from liability for the servant's negligence. If the 
servant is about the master's business, even 
though also attending to private affairs, he is 
within the scope of his employment and the master 
is liable." 
7 
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It is conceded that this case is not a workmen's 
compensation case, but it spells out the philosophy of 
the Supreme Court with regard to deviation from em-
ployment and frolics. Other cases, while not Industrial 
cases, to the same effect are Cannon v. Goodyear 1'irc 
~Rubber Co., 60 U. 346, 208 P. 519; "Ji'ox v. Lavender, 
89 U. 115, 56 P.2d 1049; Barney v. Jewel Tea Co., 104 
U. 292, 139 P.2d 878; Chatelain v. Thackeray, 98 17. 
525, 100 P.2d 191. 
POINT II 
THE ~IATTERS IN CONTENTION ARE 
MATTERS OF LAW AND NOT MATTERS o:F 
FACT. 
The applicant contends that there are no factual 
disputes with the fin dings of the Commission of a signi-
ficant nature which would effect the ultimate result of 
the case. However, the legal inferences to be drawn 
from the facts are in dispute and it is these conclusions 
of law that applicant bases his contention that the Com-
mission erred. 
Under the facts of this case there can be but one 
conclusion reached, and that is that Mr. Morley was 
within the scope of his employment at the time of the 
accident as a matter of law. 
8 
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SUMMARY 
It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial Com-
mission erred as a matter of law in not finding the plain-
tiff within the scope of his employment at the time of 
the injuries sustained by him. 
Respectfully submitted 
Paul N. Cotro-Manes of 
COTRO-MANES, FANKHAUSER 
& BEASLEY 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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